Quantum secure direct communication network with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen
  pairs by Deng, Fu-Guo et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
05
08
01
5v
4 
 1
6 
O
ct
 2
00
6
Quantum secure direct communication network with Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen pairs
Fu-Guo Deng,1,2,3∗ Xi-Han Li,1,2 Chun-Yan Li,1,2 Ping Zhou,1,2 and Hong-Yu Zhou1,2,3
1 The Key Laboratory of Beam Technology and Material Modification of Ministry of Education,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People’s Republic of China
2 Institute of Low Energy Nuclear Physics, and Department of Material Science and Engineering,
Beijing Normal University, Beijing 100875, People’s Republic of China
3 Beijing Radiation Center, Beijing 100875, People’s Republic of China
(Dated: October 1, 2018)
We discuss the four requirements for a real point-to-point quantum secure direct communication
(QSDC) first, and then present two efficient QSDC network schemes with an N ordered Einstein-
Podolsky-Rosen pairs. Any one of the authorized users can communicate another one on the network
securely and directly.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The combination of the features of quantum systems
with information has produced many interesting and im-
portant developments in the field of the transmission and
the processing of information. Quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD), an important application of quantum me-
chanics supplies a secure way for creating a private key
between two remote parties, the sender, Bob and the
receiver, Carol. The noncloning theorem [1] forbids a
vicious eavesdropper, Eve to copy perfectly the quan-
tum signal transmitted through the quantum line, and
her action will inevitably disturb the quantum system
and leave a trick in the results. Bob and Carol can find
out Eve by comparing some of the results chosen ran-
domly and analyzing its error rate. Combined with a
private key, secret message can be transmitted securely
with one-time-pad crypto-system. QKD has progressed
quickly [2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12] since Bennett and
Brassard proposed the standard BB84 QKD protocol [2]
in 1984. The reason may be that the modern technology
allows QKD to be demonstrated in laboratory [6] and
practical applications can be achieved in the future.
Recently, a novel branch of quantum communication,
quantum secure direct communication (QSDC) was pro-
posed and actively pursued by some groups [13, 14, 15,
16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26]. With QSDC
Bob and Carol can exchange the secret message directly
without generating a private key in advance and then
encrypting the message, which is different to QKD. In
2002, Beige et al. [26] presented a QSDC protocol in
which the message can be read out after the transmis-
sion of an additional classical information for each qubit
[13, 14, 20], similar to a QKD scheme as each bit of key
can represent one bit of secret message with an addi-
tional classical information, i.e., retaining or flipping the
bit value in the key according to the secret message [13].
The same case takes place in Refs. [17, 18, 19]. In 2002,
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Bostro¨m and Felbinger proposed a ping-pong QSDC fol-
lowing some ideas in quantum dense coding [27] with
an Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen (EPR) pair. The authors
have claimed that it is secure for generating a private
key and quasi-secure for direct communication as it will
leak some of the secret message in a noise channel [20].
Wo´jcik and Zhang et al. pointed out that the ping-pong
protocol is insecure for direct communication if there are
losses in a practical quantum channel [28, 29]. Also, the
ping-pong protocol [20] can be attacked without eaves-
dropping [30, 31]. Cai and Li [21] modified the ping-pong
protocol for transmitting the secret message directly by
replacing the entangled photons with a single photon in a
mixed state, similar to the Bennett 1992 QKD [5]. Mean-
while, Deng et al. put forward a two-step QSDC proto-
col [13] with EPR pairs transmitted in block and another
one based on a sequence of polarized single photons [14].
Wang et al. [15] introduced a QSDC protocol with high-
dimension quantum superdense coding. The good nature
of the QSDC schemes [13, 14, 15, 16] with quantum data
block is that the parties can perform quantum privacy
amplification [32, 33, 34] on the unknown states for im-
proving their security in a noise channel. In Ref. [24],
Cai and Li designed a protocol for improving the capac-
ity of the ping-pong QSDC protocol [20] with the same
way for eavesdropping check as that in Ref. [13]. How-
ever, it is not unconditionally secure as the analysis of
eavesdropping check depends on the feature of statistics
for which a lot of samples should be chosen randomly
and measured. Recently, Lucamarini et al. [25] intro-
duced a QSDC protocol for both direct communication
and creating a private key with the same ideas in the
Refs. [9, 14]. It is secure for QKD, same as Ref. [9], but
it is just quasi-secure for direct communication, similar
to the QSDC protocol in Ref. [24].
By far, there are many QKD network schemes [35,
36, 37, 38, 39, 40] in which one user can communicate
any other one on the network, but not a QSDC network
scheme even though there are some point-to-point QSDC
schemes [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25,
26] existing. Moreover, almost all of the existing QSDC
point-to-point schemes cannot be used directly to accom-
2plish the task in a QSDC network as a distrustful server
can steal some information without being detected. In
this paper, we will introduce two QSDC network schemes
with an ordered N EPR photon pairs. One authorized
user can communicate any one on the network securely
with the capability of single-photon measurements in the
first scheme. As almost all the instances are useful and
each EPR photon pair can carry two bits of informa-
tion, the intrinsic efficiency for qubits and the source ca-
pacity are both high. In the second scheme, the users
can exploit entanglement swapping to transmit the secret
message securely after they set up the quantum chan-
nel, the EPR pairs shared. As the qubits encoded by
the sender do not suffer from the noise of the quantum
line again, its security may be higher than the first one.
On the other hand, it has only half the source capac-
ity of the first scheme. Also, the four requirements for a
real secure point-to-point quantum direct communication
scheme are discussed in detail.
II. THE REQUIREMENTS FOR A REAL QSDC
From the way for transmitting the quantum data and
analyzing the security of the quantum channel, all ex-
isting QSDC schemes can attributed to one of the two
types, the one in which the quantum signal is transmitted
in a stream (stream-QSDC) and the other in a quantum
data block (QDB-QSDC). The feature of stream-QSDC
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] is that Bob and Carol choose
randomly the eavesdropping check mode or the message-
coding mode with two asymmetric probabilities for the
quantum signal transmitted in a stream (one photon in
each round). In the check mode, Bob and Carol obtain
a sample for eavesdropping check by means that they
choose one or two sets of measuring bases (MBs) to mea-
sure it [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. When they choose the
message mode, they encode the secret message on the
quantum state directly. In a word, the security check
and the encoding of the secret message are done concur-
rently in stream-QSDC protocols [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25].
The property of QDB-QSDC [13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19]
is that the quantum signal is transmitted in a quantum
data block. That is, Bob and Carol have to transmit
a sequence of quantum states and check its security be-
fore Bob encodes the secret message on them. In brief,
the encoding of the secret messages is done only after
the confirmation of the security of the quantum channel
[13, 14, 15, 16] is accomplished.
In essence, the security of quantum communication
bases on the two principles: (1). one is the proper-
ties of quantum states, such as the uncertainty prin-
ciple (no-cloning theorem), quantum correlations, non-
locality, and so on; (2). the other is the analysis for quan-
tum error rate based on the theories in statistics. The
first principle ensures that Eve cannot copy the quan-
tum states freely as her action will inevitably perturb the
quantum systems, which will introduce some errors in the
results. The second one is used to check the security of
the quantum channel after Bob and Carol transmit the
sufficient quantum states. The check for eavesdropping
is valid only when Bob and Carol can sample sufficiently
enough instances from results transmitted. That is, the
message may be secure only when they are obtained after
checking eavesdropping.
For QKD Bob and Carol can choose randomly one of
two MBs for the quantum states transmitted in one by
one as the analysis of the eavesdropping check is just a
postprocessing. The security of QKD requires them to
determine whether there is an eavesdropper monitoring
the quantum channel. The case in QSDC is different to
QKD as the two parties cannot abandon the secret mes-
sage transmitted. In brief, a real point-to-point QSDC
protocol should satisfy the four requirements: (1) the se-
cret message can be read out by the receiver directly after
the quantum states are transmitted through a quantum
channel, and there is no additional classical information
exchanged by the sender and the receiver in principle ex-
cept for those for checking eavesdropping and estimating
the error rate. (2) the eavesdropper, Eve cannot obtain
an useful information about the secret message no mat-
ter what she does; In another word, she can only get a
random result for the message with her eavesdropping
on the quantum signal. (3) the two legitimate users can
detect Eve before they encode the secret message on the
quantum states. (4) the quantum states are transmitted
in a quantum data block. The last one is not necessary
for QKD as the two authorized users just distribute a
key which does not include the information about the se-
cret message in this time and can be abandoned if they
find out Eve monitoring the quantum channel. QSDC is
used for directly communicating the secret message which
cannot be discarded. The security of quantum commu-
nication depends on the analysis for quantum error rate
based on the theories of statistics in which many sam-
ples are chosen randomly for its accuracy. In this way,
the quantum states should be transmitted in a quantum
data block in a QSDC.
From the view of security, the QDB-QSDC protocols
[13, 14, 15, 16] are secure with some other quantum tech-
niques, such as quantum privacy amplification [33, 34],
in a noise quantum channel. The stream-QSDC proto-
cols [20, 21, 24] are just quasi-secure as the authorized
users cannot take a quantum privacy amplification on
the quantum states transmitted one by one, which is in
principle different to the QDB-QSDC protocols.
III. QSDC NETWORK WITH EPR PAIRS
A. Bidirectional QSDC network
An EPR pair can be in one of the four Bell states [42],
|ψ−〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B |1〉C − |1〉B|0〉C) (1)
3|ψ+〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B |1〉C + |1〉B|0〉C) (2)
|φ−〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B |0〉C − |1〉B|1〉C) (3)
|φ+〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B |0〉C + |1〉B|1〉C) (4)
where |0〉 and |1〉 are the eigenvectors of the Pauli oper-
ator σz (for example the polarizations along the z direc-
tion). The subscripts B and C indicate the two corre-
lated photons in each EPR pair. The four local unitary
operations Ui (i = 0, 1, 2, 3) can transform one of the Bell
states into another,
U0 ≡ I = |0〉〈0|+ |1〉〈1|, (5)
U1 ≡ σz = |0〉〈0| − |1〉〈1|, (6)
U2 ≡ σx = |0〉〈1|+ |1〉〈0|, (7)
U3 ≡ iσy = |0〉〈1| − |1〉〈0|, (8)
where I is the 2× 2 identity matrix and σi are the Pauli
matrices. For example,
I ⊗ U0|ψ−〉 = |ψ−〉, I ⊗ U1|ψ−〉 = |ψ+〉, (9)
I ⊗ U2|ψ−〉 = |φ−〉, I ⊗ U3|ψ−〉 = |φ+〉. (10)
Although the topological structure of a QSDC net-
work can be loop or star, similar to QKD network
[35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40], its subsystem can be simplified
to that in Fig.1. That is, a QSDC network is composed
of many subsystems (the small network cells) and there
are three roles in each cell, the server (Alice), the sender
(Bob) and the receiver (Carol). Alice provides the service
for preparing the quantum signal. Bob is the man who
wants to send a message to Carol privately. If Bob and
Carol are not in the same branch on the network [38],
we assume that the server of the branch with the sender
Bob provides the service for preparing the quantum sig-
nal, and the other servers provide the quantum line for
Bob and Carol (forbid all the others to use it) in a time
slot [39]. Then the principle of this QSDC network is
explicit if we describe clearly the subsystem in Fig.1.
Now, let us describe our bidirectional QSDC network
scheme in detail. First, we only consider the ideal con-
dition. That is, we assume that there is no noise and
losses in the quantum channel, and the devices are per-
fect. The case with a practical quantum line and devices
will be discussed in section IV. For the subsystem, the
QSDC can be implemented with seven steps.
(1) All the users on the network agree that the server,
Alice prepares an orderedN EPR pairs in the same quan-
tum state |ψ−〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B |1〉C − |1〉B|0〉C) for the
quantum communication in each round. Alice divides it
into two sequences, SB and SC . The SB is composed of
all the B photons in the N ordered EPR pairs, and the
SC is composed of all the C photons.
(2) Alice sends the two sequences SB and SC to Bob
and Carol, respectively.
CarolAlice
SC
Bob
Receiver
SB
Sender Server
FIG. 1: The subsystem of the present QSDC network. There
are two sequences of photons, SB and SC , which are trans-
mitted to the sender Bob and the receiver Carol, respectively.
The server, Alice provides the service for preparing and mea-
suring the Bell states in the sequence of the EPR pairs. The
legitimate users exploit the four local unitary operations to
encode their message and complete the eavesdropping check
with choosing one of the two measuring bases σz and σx ran-
domly.
(3) After receiving the SB and SC sequences, Bob and
Carol choose randomly a sufficiently large subset of the
N EPR pairs as the samples for checking eavesdropping,
and they measure each photon in each sample EPR pair
with the measuring basis (MB) σz or σx chosen ran-
domly. They complete the error rate analysis by compar-
ing the outcomes in public, same as that in the Bennett-
Brassard-Mermin 1992 (BBM92) QKD protocol [4]. If
the error rate is zero, they continue to next step, oth-
erwise they abandon their transmission and repeat the
quantum communication from the beginning.
For preventing the eavesdropper, the dishonest server
from eavesdropping by using Trojan horse attack with
multi-photon signal [6] (For the attack with some invis-
ible photons, the parties can exploit a suitable filter to
allow just the photons with some a special frequency to
be operated [6].), Bob and Carol can complete the eaves-
dropping check with two steps [41]. They can divide the
samples into two parts. One is used to determine whether
there are many photons in the sample signal. The other
is used to determine whether the state of the quantum
signal is disturbed. For the first part, the two parties,
Bob and Carol can use a photon beam splitter to split
the quantum signal, and measure them with two single-
photon detectors. If there are many photons in the quan-
tum signal received by the two parties, the two detectors
will both be clicked with a large probability for each of
the samples. In this way, the attack with Trojan horse
can be found out. For the other samples, Bob and Carol
measure them with two MBs σz and σx chosen randomly,
same as that in Ref. [41].
For authenticating the outcomes published by Bob and
Carol, they should share a certain amount of classical
key in advance, or they have a special classical channel
in which the information cannot be altered even though
any one can eavesdrop it, same as QKD [6].
(4) Carol chooses randomly one of the four local uni-
tary operations {U0, U1, U2, U3} which represent the two
bits of information 00, 11, 01 and 10 respectively, on each
photon in the SC sequence (except for the photons cho-
4sen for eavesdropping check), and then she tells Bob the
fact that she has operated her sequence SC . She sends
the SC sequence to the server Alice. The operations done
by Carol is denoted as UC .
(5) Bob encodes his message on the photons in the SB
sequence with one of the four local unitary operations
{Ui} (i = 0, 1, 2, 3), say UB, according to the message
MB, and then she also sends the SB sequence to the
server Alice.
For analyzing the error rate of this transmission, Bob
picks out k photons (the k sample photon pairs are com-
posed of them and the correlated photons in the SC se-
quence) randomly distributing in the SB sequence and
performs one of the four unitary operations randomly
before he encodes the SB sequence. The number k is not
big as long as it can provide an analysis for the error rate.
(6) Alice performs Bell state measurements on the pho-
ton pairs and publishes the outcomes UA = UB ⊗ UC .
(7) Bob and Carol exploit the k photon pairs chosen as
the sample pairs by Bob in advance to analyze the secu-
rity of the whole quantum communication and estimate
its error rate. In detail, Bob tells Carol her operations
on the sample pairs and Carol compares them with the
outcomes published by Alice. If the error rate is zero,
Carol reads out the message MB with UB = UA ⊗ UC .
Otherwise, they discard the results.
In a QSDC network scheme, the most powerful eaves-
dropper may be the dishonest server Alice as she pre-
pares the quantum signal and she can hide her eaves-
dropping with cheating besides other strategies. If it is
secure for the untrustworthy server, the present QSDC
network scheme is secure for any eavesdropper. So we
only discuss the eavesdropping done by the server Alice
below.
The operations UC done by Carol are used to shield
the effect of the code done by Bob. It is equivalent to
encrypting Bob’s message with an one-time pad crypto-
system. The random key is just the operations chosen
randomly by Carol. In this way, the present QSDC net-
work is secure if the transmission of the two sequences
from the server Alice to the users Bob and Carol is se-
cure as Alice’s action on the last stage can only obtain
the combined outcome UA = UB⊗UC which will be pub-
lished by the server and the cheat that Alice publishes a
wrong information in both the first stage when the quan-
tum signal is transmitted from Alice to the users and the
last stage will be found out by Bob and Carol with the
comparison of the outcomes of the k sample photon pairs.
The transmission of the two sequences SB and SC from
the server to the users is similar BBM92 QKD protocol
[4]. The difference is just that the photons are transmit-
ted in a quantum data block in the present scheme, but
one by one in the latter. The BBM92 QKD protocol is
proven secure in both an ideal condition [43] and a prac-
tical condition [44]. Hence, the present QSDC network
scheme can be made to be secure. Moreover, as almost
all the instances can be used to carry the message except
for those for eavesdropping check, the intrinsic efficiency
for qubits ηq in the present QSDC network scheme ap-
proaches the maximal value 1.
ηq ≡ qu
qt
, (11)
where qu and qt are the qubits useful and total qubits for
the transmission. Each photon pair can carry two bits
of message which is the maximal source capacity for a
two-photon entangled state in quantum communication
[6, 42]. The users (except for the server) are required to
have the capability of single-photon measurements, which
may make this network scheme convenient in application.
B. QSDC network with entanglement swapping
In a practical quantum channel, there are noise and
loss which maybe affect the security of the network
communication. The quantum channel, a sequence of
EPR pairs in the same state |ψ−〉BC = 1√
2
(|0〉B|1〉C −
|1〉B|0〉C) can be set up securely with entanglement pu-
rification [32, 33]. But this case does not take place when
the quantum states are encoded with the local opera-
tions. In this way, the users can accomplish the quantum
communication with entanglement swapping [45]. In de-
tail, the subsystem of the QSDC network can work as
follows:
(1) The server Alice provides the service for Bob and
Carol to securely share a sequence of EPR pairs in the
same state |ψ−〉, same as that in the bidirectional QSDC
network scheme discussed above.
(2) After purifying the EPR pairs [32], Bob and Carol
can obtain a short sequence of maximally entangled two-
photon states. The two users divide them into some
groups. There are two EPR pairs in each group, say
|ψ−〉B1C1 and |ψ−〉B2C2 . Bob encodes his message on
the first EPR pair in each group with the operations Ui
(i=0,1,2,3) and then performs a Bell-basis measurement
on the photons B1 and B2. He announces his outcome
in public.
(3) The receiver Carol takes a Bell-basis on his photons
C1 and C2 to read out the message. That is,
|ψ−〉B1C1 ⊗ |ψ−〉B2C2 =
1
2
(|ψ−〉B1B2 |ψ−〉C1C2
−|ψ+〉B1B2 |ψ+〉C1C2 − |φ−〉B1B2 ⊗ |φ−〉C1C2
+|φ+〉B1B2 |φ+〉C1C2), (12)
|ψ+〉B1C1 ⊗ |ψ−〉B2C2 =
1
2
(|ψ+〉B1B2 |ψ−〉C1C2
−|ψ−〉B1B2 |ψ+〉C1C2 + |φ+〉B1B2 |φ−〉C1C2
−|φ−〉B1B2 |φ+〉C1C2), (13)
|φ−〉B1C1 ⊗ |ψ−〉B2C2 =
1
2
(|φ−〉B1B2 |ψ−〉C1C2
−|φ+〉B1B2 |ψ+〉C1C2 − |ψ−〉B1B2 |φ−〉C1C2
+|ψ+〉B1B2 |φ+〉C1C2), (14)
|φ+〉B1C1 ⊗ |ψ−〉B2C2 =
1
2
(|φ+〉B1B2 |ψ−〉C1C2
5−|φ−〉B1B2 |ψ+〉C1C2 + |ψ+〉B1B2 |φ−〉C1C2
−|ψ−〉B1B2 |φ+〉C1C2). (15)
Carol can deduce Bob’s operation according to the re-
sult of her Bell-state measurement and the information
published by Bob easily.
In this QSDC network scheme, the sender Bob need not
transmit the qubits to the server Alice after he encoded
his message on them. That is, Bob and Carol do not
give the chance for Alice to access the qubits again when
the quantum channel (a sequence of EPR pairs shared)
is confirmed to be secure. This principle will improve the
security of the quantum communication in a noise condi-
tion as the qubits do not suffer from the noise and losses
of the quantum line again. The effect of the noise in quan-
tum line on the qubits which are transmitted between the
server and the users can be eliminated with entanglement
purification [32] and quantum privacy amplification [33].
Thus this network scheme can be made to be secure. On
the other hand, the users should have the capability of
taking a Bell-basis measurement on their qubits in this
QSDC network scheme, which will increase the difficulty
of its implementation in a practical application. More-
over, each EPR pair shared between the sender and the
receiver can carry only one bit of information in theory,
half of that in the bidirectional one.
IV. SECURITY ANALYSIS
In essence, the server Alice first provides the service for
the users to share a sequence of EPR pairs in these two
QSDC network schemes, and the two authorized users
confirm the security of the quantum channel and then
encode and decode the secret message after they puri-
fied their EPR pairs. With the analysis for the samples
by using two MBs, σz and σx, the sender and the re-
ceiver can share securely a sequence of EPR pairs, sim-
ilar to BBM92 QKD protocol [4]. The difference is just
that all the qubits in BBM92 protocol are measured and
the authorized users use classical privacy amplification
to distill a private string. In these two QSDC network
schemes, Bob and Carol can also use the entanglement
purification [32] and quantum privacy amplification [33]
to share a sequence of EPR pairs securely. In this way,
their security can be the same one. As the security of the
network schemes depend on completely that of the quan-
tum channel, they are secure since the quantum channel
can be made to be secure with entanglement purification
[32, 33]. Surely, the users can use the technique of en-
tanglement purity testing code [46] to save the entangled
source largely for setting up their quantum channel.
We can also use the relation of the error rate and the
correspondent maximal amount of information obtain-
able for the suspect server from a photon in each pair to
demonstrate the security of the quantum channel set up
following the ideas in Refs. [20, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53,
54, 55]. In fact, the effect of the eavesdropping on the
two photons in an EPR pair with two unitary operations
is equal to that on one photon with another unitary op-
eration [56], i.e., (UeB ⊗UeC)|ψ−〉BC = (Ue⊗ I)|ψ−〉BC .
As Bob and Carol check eavesdropping with choosing the
two MBs σz and σx randomly, same as the BBM92 QKD
protocol [4], the eavesdropping done by Eve can be real-
ized by a unitary operation, say, Eˆ on a larger Hilbert
space. That is, Eve can perform the unitary transforma-
tion Eˆ on the photon B and the ancilla e [51, 53] whose
state is initially in |0〉 [56].
Eˆ|0〉B|0〉 =
√
F |0〉|e00〉+
√
D|1〉|e01〉, (16)
Eˆ|1〉B|0〉 =
√
D|0〉|e10〉+
√
F |1〉|e11〉 (17)
where F is the fidelity of the state of the photon B af-
ter the eavesdropping, D is the probability that Bob and
Carol can detect the action of eavesdropper, and the uni-
tary of the operation Eˆ requires the relations as follows
〈e00|e00〉+ 〈e01|e01〉 = F +D = 1, (18)
〈e10|e10〉+ 〈e11|e11〉 = D + F = 1, (19)
〈e00|e10〉+ 〈e01|e11〉 = 0. (20)
With the unitary operation Eˆ done by Eve and the
unitary operations Ui done by Bob with the probabilities
Pi (i = 0, 1, 2, 3), the final state of the photon B and the
ancilla e is described as follows [50].
ε(ρB) =
3∑
i=0
PiεUi(ρB), (21)
where Pi is the probability encoded with the operation
Ui, ρB = TrC(ρBC) =
1
2
(
1 0
0 1
)
, and εUi is quantum
operation describing the evolution of the initial state ρB,
i.e.,
εUi(ρB) = UiEˆρB ⊗ |e〉〈e|Eˆ+Ui. (22)
The accessible information extracted from the state
ε(ρB) is no more than the Holevo bound [20, 42, 50],
i.e.,
IC ≤ S(ε(ρB))−
3∑
i=0
PiS(εUi(ρB)) ≡ I0, (23)
where S(ρ) is the von-Neumann entropy of the state ρ,
i.e.,
S(ρ) = −Tr{ρlog2ρ} =
3∑
i=0
−λi log2 λi, (24)
where λi are the roots of the characteristic polynomial
det(ρ−λI) [20]. As we use a mixed state to describe the
photon B, Eve can steal the bit value or the phase of the
operations done by Bob, same as Ref. [50]. In fact, the
information that Eve can steal is no more than twice of
I0.
6Certainly, Eve can eavesdrop the operation done by
Bob UB with two unitary operations and two ancilla sys-
tems, but it does not increase the information about the
operation UB and not decrease the probability D. Now,
let us calculate the value of I0 in the case that Carol
chooses the four local unitary operations with the same
probability Pi =
1
4
. Define an orthonormal base {|00〉,
|01〉, |10〉, |11〉} which spans the generic subspace of the
Hilbert space HC ⊗He support of ε(ρˆC). With the Eqs.
(16)-(24), we can obtain the relation between I0 and the
probability D as following.
I0 = −Dlog2D − (1−D)log2(1−D). (25)
When D = 0.25, the information that Eve can obtain
IE ≤ 2I0 = 1.62 < 2. That is, Bob and Carol can
set up the quantum channel securely with entanglement
purification [32] and quantum privacy amplification [33],
similar to QKDwith a classical privacy amplification [42].
In a practical quantum channel, there are noise and
losses which will threaten the security of quantum com-
munication. The present QSDC network schemes are
secure in a closely ideal condition, but it is also af-
fected by the noise and the losses in a practical chan-
nel, same as the two-step QSDC protocol [13] and others
[14, 15, 16, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. The quantum states
are transmitted in a quantum data in the present QSDC
network scheme, which will ensure it to overcome the ef-
fect of the noise in the practical channel as the parties
can use quantum privacy amplification technique [33] to
improve the security of the quantum states transmitted.
This advantage happens only in the QSDC schemes with
quantum data block, such as Refs. [13, 14, 15]. In or-
der to reduce the effect of the losses, another quantum
technique, quantum teleportation [27] can be used to de-
termine whether the receiver has obtained the photons
sent by the server Alice in the process of the transmis-
sion for the SC sequence, same as that in the two-step
QSDC scheme [13]. That is, Carol should prepare an-
other N EPR pairs and perform quantum teleportation
on the photons in the SC sequence with her EPR pairs.
If the teleportation successes, she tells Bob to encode
the correlated photon in the SB sequence. On the other
hand, the present network schemes can be also used to
distribute a private key and the users need not exploit
quantum teleportation to improve its security in a loss
channel.
V. DISCUSSION AND SUMMARY
It is of interest to point out that the stream-QSDC
schemes [20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25] do not work for a net-
work as they are only quasi-secure in a practical chan-
nel. It is difficult for the users to do the error correction
and the privacy amplification in those QSDC schemes
[20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25]. In particular, the privacy ampli-
fication cannot be accomplished as the photon is trans-
mitted one by one and the information transmitted is the
deterministic message, not a random key. The QSDC
schemes in Refs. [14, 15] cannot be used to complete the
task of a QSDC network in a simple way as the server
who prepares the quantum signal can steal almost all the
information about the message without being found out
in a noise channel. For example, in the QSDC network
with the quantum one-time pad scheme [14], the server
can intercept the photons encoded by Bob and read out
the operations freely. Certainly, the two users can ex-
ploit some other technique to improve the security, but
the classical information exchanged will increase largely,
same as the QSDC schemes with quantum teleporation
[17] and quantum swapping [18] which are close to QKD.
In summary, we have proposed two QSDC network
schemes with EPR pairs. In the first one, the server pre-
pares and measures the EPR pairs and the users exploit
the four local unitary operations to encode their message,
which makes the users on the network more convenient
than others in a practical application. One can commu-
nicate any other one on the network securely as they can
perform a quantum privacy amplification on the quan-
tum states transmitted in a noise channel. Its intrinsic
efficiency for qubits and source capacity are both high as
almost all of the instances are useful and each EPR pair
can carry two bits of information. In the second QSDC
network scheme, the users exploit entanglement swap-
ping to transmit the secret message, which will improve
its security in a noise quantum line at the risk of low-
ering its source capacity and increasing the difficulty of
the experimental implementation for the users. Also, the
four requirements for a real secure point-to-point quan-
tum direct communication scheme are discussed in detail
and the present QSDC network schemes satisfy all the
four requirements.
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